

The Impact of the Struggle for a New World Order on UN Peacekeeping in Eurasia

Tigran Torosyan¹ and Arax Vardanyan²

Abstract

Over the past decades, significant progress has been made in international law towards the formation of the instruments of the UN peacekeeping mission and the legal basis for addressing self-determination conflicts. However, all the problems associated with these processes have not been solved. The issue is particularly significant for Eurasia, where the majority of conflicts related to self-determination take place. The resolution of these disputes without the use of modern norms and tools of international law can lead to ethnic cleansing and even genocide. To prevent these tragic consequences, which become more likely during the period when the rivalry for the establishment of a new global order intensifies, it is suggested that these conflicts be resolved through UN peacekeeping operations. The article examines the impact of the geopolitical transformations, on the implementation of the UN peacekeeping missions, for the purpose of settling self-determination disputes. It is proposed to consider it on the basis of the three-stage model of the struggle for a new world order. For each of these stages, the article presents the possibilities of the implementation of the UN peacekeeping mission, its obstacles and the ways to overcome them, drawing on the Eurasian cases of East Timor, Kosovo, and Nagorno-Karabakh. The study reveals that the dynamics of geopolitical transformations creates serious obstacles for international peacekeeping, in particular at their final stage due to the increasing severity of conflicts of interest among the permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC).

Keywords

Eurasia, UN peacekeeping, conflicts, self-determination, geopolitical transformations, UN security council

Received: 4 February 2025; accepted: 12 May 2025

Introduction

The prevention of threats to peace has been claimed as one of the main objectives of the United Nations, established almost immediately after the Second World War, which had devastating effects. Since the end of the Cold War, the UN has made substantial efforts to address the ongoing violent conflicts (White et al., 2018). Nevertheless, no decrease can be traced in the number of situations that require intervention. Moreover, under the influence of increasing tensions in international relations, especially the activation of a new world order formation, conflicts escalate and turn into military aggression and bloody wars (Torosyan & Vardanyan, 2015). Among the many scientific studies on the crisis management, peacebuilding, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and mediation, articles on the prevention of

wars in the exercise of the right to self-determination hold a special place; 145 self-determination movements are known in 77 countries worldwide, with 44% of those cases being accompanied by wars (Marshall & Gurr, 2003). The increasing interest in this issue is due to the fact that in most of

¹Department of International Relations, Russian-Armenian University, Yerevan, Armenia

²Department of Conflict Research and Conflict Resolution, Center of Perspective Researches and Initiatives, Yerevan, Armenia

Corresponding Author:

Tigran Torosyan, Department of International Relations, Russian-Armenian University, Mashtots street 41, ap. 17, 0009 Armenia, Yerevan, Armenia.



the cases falling under this category the metropolis is seeking to solve the problem through war, because of the fear that the territory seeking to self-determination can be separated from it. For this reason, such wars are very often characterized by particular cruelty. The metropolis often prefers to oust the people seeking to self-determination, even by means of ethnic cleansing or genocide, thereby resolving the issue of preserving this territory (Torosyan & Vardanyan, 2024).

The problem is of particular importance for Eurasia. According to H. Mackinder's geopolitical theory (Mackinder, 1904, 1919), this region and, in particular, the Eurasian Heartland are crucial in shaping the world order. In this region, there is fierce rivalry between the most powerful countries, without regard for international law. It is no coincidence that most conflicts of self-determination are concentrated here (Marshall & Gurr, 2003).

To avoid this dramatic scenario, it is necessary, on the one hand, to identify the difficulties faced by international peacekeeping missions and the obstacles arising with regard to their establishment, and, on the other hand, to improve the existent mechanisms, models, and tools to ensure the effectiveness of these missions. Since a large body of research confirms the explicit link between the establishment of peace and the UN peacekeeping (Howard, 2014), the article will largely focus on the UN-led missions. In the meantime, it is obvious that not all states express political will to assist those missions. In 2005, the UN member states committed to use preventive diplomacy to establish a "preventive culture" (Secretary-General, 2011). Meanwhile, the document of 2015 adopted in this regard hold that "the organization and its member states have not yet mastered the culture of prevention" (UNGA, 2015). The challenges are not only related to the use of new mechanisms.

Researchers, who study the factors triggering the adoption of the UN resolutions on preventing the resumption of hostilities in the event of self-determination conflicts, posit that the effectiveness of the UN activities is limited by the interests of superpowers and the permanent members of the UNSC (UNSC, 2022). Nevertheless, this factor has not been well considered among the many factors determining the efforts of the UN (White et al., 2018). Beardsley and Schmidt (2012) acknowledge that the UNSC actions are often driven by the interests of the five permanent members. Meanwhile, they argue that this influence is weaker than the aspiration to address serious threats to international stability. Still, in a number of cases, even in the presence of irrefutable facts, the UNSC does not respond to apparent threats to peace due to the opposition of some of its permanent members. This may endanger regional security and lead to humanitarian disaster.

Paris (2014) suggested a "move from micro-level to macro-level analyses" of peacekeeping missions to take into account major geopolitical changes in order to better understand peacekeeping operations. Cunliffe responded to

this by addressing the attempts of emerging states to use peacekeeping interventions to change the international order (Cunliffe & Kenkel 2016), the goals of international interventions—were they implemented to prevent humanitarian disasters or to enforce specific policy (Cunliffe, 2020)? However, there is a need for additional research, especially regarding the impact of geopolitical transformations on the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations, as it has especially increased in recent years, that is, in the final stage of these transformations.

The contribution of this article to the research on UN peacekeeping activities is that it discusses the influence of the dynamics of increasing tension in different stages of new world order formation on the UN peacekeeping activities and effective mechanisms are proposed to refine three-dimensional model (White et al., 2018) in order to ensure the smooth implementation of UN peacekeeping activities in conflict resolution processes in Eurasia.

Research Methodology and Structure

According to Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, the main task of post-conflict management is to prevent the recurrence of war (Friedrich, 2005). This gains particular importance with regard to conflicts arising in connection with the exercise of the right to self-determination. In such cases, the failure to prevent or stop the violence committed by the metropolis may lead to genocide or ethnic cleansing of the people seeking to self-determination. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the cases of the use/non-use of peacekeeping activities (the circumstances of the adoption/non-adoption of the relevant UNSC resolutions) in the event of self-determination conflicts in order to prevent such disasters through their successful implementation of peacekeeping. Though the number of studies on these phenomena has increased meaningfully, while evaluating the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions, some factors of their establishment are not given due attention. Among those factors are the controversial positions of the UNSC permanent members when discussing resolutions on the establishment of peacekeeping activities, in the event of self-determination conflicts. The interests of these countries are more pronounced in situations of great geopolitical significance.

In this article, international peacekeeping activities used in the event of self-determination conflicts are considered in the context of the three—initial, intermediate, and final—stages of the struggle for the formation of a new world order (Torosyan & Vardanyan, 2021). According to landmark events, which reflect the qualitative change in relations between the permanent members of the UN SC, the years 1991–2014 can be considered the initial stage of this struggle, the intermediate stage—the years 2014–2021, and the final stage—started since 2021. For each of these stages, the article considers one self-determination conflict, namely, the cases of East-Timor, Kosovo, and Nagorno-Karabakh.

Though international community has recognized them as the conflicts of self-determination, all three cases have been accompanied by bloody wars, resumption of hostilities, or the attempt of it. Although all these cases perfectly correspond to the conditions of self-determination, however, they have significant differences in terms of their settlement processes. In case of East Timor, considered as an example of the application of the UN peacekeeping mission at the initial stage of the formation of new world order, the hostilities were halted by the UN peacekeeping mission, then the process of settlement was finalized with the help of the international interim administration. A typical example of the intermediate stage is the case of Kosovo, where hostilities were halted due to the establishment of international peacekeeping mission, and the resumption of new hostilities was quickly addressed in 2004. At the boundary between the aforementioned initial and intermediate stages, the conflict was recognized by the representatives of UN as a self-determination conflict. In 2010, the International Court of Justice recognized the unilateral declaration of Kosovo's independence as lawful under the international law (ICJ, 2010). This was followed by the recognition of more than one hundred states, but Kosovo has not yet joined the UN. The case of Nagorno-Karabakh is considered as an example of the final third stage. It received the status of self-determination conflict at the boundary between the initial and intermediate stages, and was subjected to a second military aggression in 2020 (EP, 2021; Foreign Relations Committee, 2022; Lemkin Institute, 2022; Sénat, 2020). The war resumed, causing the disruption of the 30-year-old mediation mission of the OSCE Minsk Group (MG). Since December 2022, Nagorno-Karabakh has been under siege. In September 2023, as a result of the resumption of aggression by Azerbaijani army, 120,000 Armenians were subjected to ethnic cleansing and forced out of Nagorno-Karabakh.

The process of settlement of these conflicts varies in two important ways. In Kosovo, it has not been completed, while in Nagorno-Karabakh, the UN peacekeeping mission has not been yet established. The last circumstance is especially noteworthy, because in that case the aforementioned threats remain. These differences correspond to the dynamics of growing tension at the three stages of the formation of a new world order and are related to the time of the adoption of the UNSC resolutions on the establishment of peacekeeping missions for these conflicts. This hypothesis can be tested using White et al.'s (2018) empirical model, according to which the UN decision-makers consider three factors: the dispute's conflict history, the potential for regional contagion, and the characteristics of the dispute (geographically concentrated population, the same ethnic kin in other states, etc.). When assessing the history of violence during the conflict, it is considered whether there has been a war or the threat of it since 1946, in connection with the process of self-

determination. With regard to the second factor, under consideration is the number of countries in which similar hostilities have been conducted and the capitals of which are no more than 900 km away from the capital of the country in question (Weidmann et al., 2010). The authors of the model posit that while establishing peacekeeping missions the UNSC considers these three factors in the listed order.

These factors are clearly pronounced in case of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In terms of the history of violence preceding the military aggression of 2020 (the first factor), one could mention the military aggression against Nagorno-Karabakh in the years of 1992–1994 (Gor, 2008) and the large-scale military operation lasted for 4 days in April 2016. The regional factor is also present; the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, the self-determination movements of the Kurds in Turkey and Iraq, etc., meet the condition of conflicts at a distance not exceeding 900 km. As for the third factor, at least two of the characteristics of the conflict (geographically concentrated population of the people seeking to self-determination and the same ethnic kin in other states) are also present. In the 1920s, Armenians made up more than 95% of the population of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region, which during the existence of the USSR was handed over to Azerbaijan at the behest of Stalin and by the decision of the Communist Party of Russia. In 1988, their number was also high—more than 80% of the population. When Azerbaijan announced its withdrawal from the USSR in 1991, the referendum was held in Nagorno-Karabakh for the people to exercise their right to self-determination, which ended with the creation of an independent state. As for the communities of the same ethnic group in other states, as is known, Armenia is predominantly populated by the Armenians, and there are large Armenian communities in neighboring Georgia, Iran, Russia, as well as in the US, France, and several other countries.

Noticeably, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict fully meets the requirements of the model put forward by White and others, and the UN peacekeeping mission was supposed to have been established here; however, this was not done. Thus, it is necessary to find out the answer of the questions below:

- (1) Why the UN peacekeeping mission has not been established for the Nagorno-Karabakh?
- (2) Is it because of the conflict of interests between the UNSC permanent members under the conditions of an extremely intensified struggle for the formation of a new world order?
- (3) What is the effect of the conflict of interests of the UNSC permanent members at different stages of geopolitical transformations on the adoption of resolutions on the use of peacekeeping activities in the event of self-determination conflicts?

To address these questions, the article first discusses the conceptual bases of peacekeeping missions in the settlement of conflicts during the three stages of the formation of a new world order. Furthermore, it addresses the clash of interests between the UNSC permanent members at these stages, its influence on the settlement of self-determination conflicts, as well as specific cases of conflict settlement process typical to each of these stages (initial stage—East Timor, intermediate stage—Kosovo, and final stage—Nagorno-Karabakh).

The research methodology is based on the principles of comparative analysis of successful/unsuccessful cases of war prevention in the settlement of self-determination conflicts (Torosyan & Petrosyan, 2015; Torosyan & Vardanyan, 2021).

Conceptual Foundations for the Formation of Peacekeeping Missions in the Event of Self-Determination Conflicts

The maintenance of peace and the principle of self-determination are two fundamental norms enshrined in Article 1 of the UN Charter on the purposes of the organization (Charter, 1945). The former is defined as the “prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and the suppression of acts of aggression,” whereas the latter as the “development of friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.” Addressing the challenges related to these two pillars is of key importance in terms of the effectiveness of the organization. Their implementation faces a number of obstacles (Lemay-Hebert, 2011). In the event of self-determination conflicts, the metropolis often tries to resist not only the realization of the right to self-determination but also the establishment of peacekeeping missions, claiming that the problem is internal and no one has the right to interfere. Nevertheless, both in international relations and at the level of scientific research, the legality of peacekeeping activities by any international organization with the consent of the UN or the UNSC or the application of the principle of self-determination for the purpose of conflict settlement is not seriously disputed. Often, this process is combined with the establishment of international administrative bodies to support the consolidation of the state that has gained independence on the basis of the right to self-determination. This is considered as a necessary tool for addressing this problem (Cunningham 2013).

Such an authority is not defined in the list of powers of the UNSC (Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter). At the same time, this list is not exhaustive (Matheson, 2001; Yannis, 2004). Article 39 of the UN Charter provides the UNSC with an unlimited power to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, any breach of the peace, or aggression. It also guarantees or determines what measures

should be applied under Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security. As to the establishment of peacekeeping missions based on military units, it is explicitly stated in Article 42. The International Court of Justice also confirms the full compliance of these powers of the SC with the UN Charter (ICJ, 1949). Unlike the authority on the use of armed forces to carry out a peacekeeping mission, Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter do not directly provide the SC with the authority to establish international interim administrations. Nevertheless, their establishment is necessary for the fulfillment of the duties provided for in Article 39 (von Carlowitz, 2003).

The status and mechanisms for the exercise of the principle of self-determination are impeccable under the international law. Still, various manipulations are sometimes used for political ends on its alleged imperfection or contradiction. The principle of self-determination has the status of *jus cogens* and *erga omnes* norm (i.e., the supreme legal norm), and it is clearly defined under the international law (Declaration, 1970; Ryngaert & Sobrie, 2011; Torosyan & Vardanyan, 2021).

Two factors should be kept in mind while discussing this issue. Once the lawful international mission has confirmed that the principle of self-determination lies at the heart of the conflict settlement, the issue of the final status of the territory in question should be addressed straightaway. The lack of clarity in this issue creates serious problems for the international administration and peacekeeping (Korhonen, 2001). It is more likely that the metropolis will resort to large-scale repression, military aggression, even ethnic cleansing and genocide when it feels there is little time to prevent the international recognition of independence. By the same consideration, the decisive phase of the conflict settlement should be carried out under the auspices of the UN, as it has the highest potential and resources to respond to crisis. In the meantime, the permanent members of the UNSC should take into account that the promotion of their own interests in such situations, at the cost of slowing down the process of settlement, may lead to military aggression or the resumption of war, with devastating effects at the national, regional and international level. Therefore, such attempts by the metropolis should become a clear indicator for the immediate intervention of the SC by adopting a resolution on international peacekeeping mission based on the goals of the organization. To prevent the recurrence of war, it is also important for the international administration to enjoy the support of the civilian population and the local authorities (Friedrich, 2005).

Thus, the principle of self-determination and the maintenance of peace are interrelated norms of key importance under the international law, the application of which is often the only way to prevent crimes against humanity in the event of self-determination conflicts. Therefore, after a decision is made to settle the conflict on the basis of the principle of

self-determination, it is important that this decision is implemented straightaway and peacekeeping mission is established in case there are signs of a resumption of war. Therefore, it is necessary to formalize the signs that indicate the inevitability of disastrous developments in the event of non-intervention. Since the most likely obstacle to the adoption of the relevant UNSC resolution may be a veto by one or several permanent members, the escalation of controversies between influential states and, primarily, the member states of the UNSC during geopolitical transformations should also be considered as an important sign. This requires consideration of the obstacles to the implementation of international peacekeeping for the purpose of conflict settlement, during the stages of such transformations, in particular, the formation of a new world order. In this regard, the factors below are of key importance while considering the process of conflict settlement:

- The beginning of conflict,
- Military aggression exercised by the metropolis,
- Cessation of hostilities,
- Determination of the nature of conflict,
- Determination of political status,
- Preventing or halting the resumption of hostilities through the establishment of international peacekeeping mission.

Based on these factors, the opportunities and challenges of implementing a peacekeeping mission at different stages of the formation of a new world order will be considered below.

International Peacekeeping and Self-Determination at the Initial Stage of the Formation of a New World Order

This stage can be divided into two periods: since the collapse of the USSR in 1991 to the start of an active struggle for the formation of a new world order (2007) and the initial period of this struggle (from 2007 to 2014).

With the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the alliance built on the communist ideology and hence the bipolar world order collapsed. Due to the unchallenging breakup of the USSR and the emergence of a number of political and economic problems in Russia related to transformation, it initially seemed that the upcoming developments would lead to the stabilization of unipolar world order, without much effort from the West (Huntington, 1991). This is probably the reason why the US did not take drastic steps towards spreading its influence in the post-Soviet space and even some initiatives were taken towards deepening cooperation on both sides. Nevertheless, the largest expansion of the EU in 2004 and the accession of a number of Eastern and Central European countries to NATO sharply increased

the tension between the US and Russia. This was openly manifested by the harsh anti-American speech of the Russian president at the Munich Security Conference in 2007 (Putin's speech, 2007). It signaled the end of the "romantic" period of the Russian-American relations and the formation of a new world order, whereas the Russian-Georgian 5-day war of the following year signaled the beginning of tough rivalry (Torosyan & Vardanyan, 2015).

The first period was characterized by the formation of the processes of conflict settlement. This, in particular, refers to the conflicts in East Timor, Kosovo, and Nagorno-Karabakh. The abovementioned six key factors will be considered below for the process of conflict settlement in East Timor.

East Timor

East Timor has been a Portuguese colony for four centuries. It gained independence in 1974 after the fall of the authoritarian regime in Portugal. This was followed by the invasion of neighboring Indonesia, ostensibly to prevent the spread of communist ideology. However, less than a year later, Indonesia declared East Timor part of its 27th province (Dunn, 2003).

In December 1975, the UN General Assembly and the Security Council condemned Indonesia's actions, and the issue has remained on the agenda of the General Assembly for 24 years. In 1982, the General Assembly instructed the Secretary-General to make diplomatic efforts to find a solution to the problem. The idea of independent East Timor was defended by Portugal, and the Office of the UN Secretary-General took the initiative to respond to the disastrous events taking place there (Krieger 1997). Nevertheless, the people of East Timor have been subjected to continuous violence and persecution by the government of Indonesia for 24 years; about 200,000 people were killed as a result of military aggression or starvation.

After the fall of Suharto's regime in 1998, the new President announced that the East Timorese would determine their own political status. On the basis of the UN resolution S/RES/1246 (1999), a referendum of independence was held in East Timor in August 1999. This was followed by a new wave of violence by the Indonesian paramilitary groups, who carried out the so-called "Scorched earth" operation. It caused the destruction of 70% of the infrastructure, including the entire power grid and housing stock (Chopra, 2000), the displacement of 70% of the population, and the lives of 1,500 East Timorese (Smith & Dee, 2003).

The international community had gradually adopted a more favorable stance on East Timor's independence from Indonesia, due to decades of lobbying by the Timorese political leaders at the United Nations (Bell, 2000). First, with the approval of the UNSC, the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) has been established based on the

armed units of different countries led by Australia. The major goal was to put an end to the violence and “establish order by all necessary means,” in accordance with Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. After addressing this problem in 5 months, the UN multilateral peacekeeping operation, called the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), has been established to carry out the following activities:

- Military peacekeeping,
- Governance and public administration,
- Humanitarian assistance and emergency rehabilitation (Howard, 2014).

In 2002, East Timor became a member of the UN and, with the help of the transitional administration, started to address the problem of institutional formation of the state.

After 13 years of presence, the UN peacekeepers were withdrawn from East Timor in December 2012, marking the continued stability of the country as a result of two successful elections (Crisis Group, 2013). The formation of the UN peacekeeping mission has been of key importance in cessation of hostilities and the final settlement of conflict.

Thus, the observation of the above six factors and their chronology with regard to the conflict in East Timor shows that the settlement of the conflict was fully achieved in the “romantic” period of the formation of a new world order. This period was the most stable one, free from tough confrontation in geopolitical sense, and due to the prompt response of the UN, it became possible to put an end to the aggression and violence.

It is noteworthy that at the initial stage of the formation of the new world order, more than a dozen countries became members of the United Nations on the basis of the right to self-determination.

International Peacekeeping and Self-Determination at the Intermediate Stage of the Formation of a New World Order

As to some professional assessments, the lack of success of the UN peacekeeping mission in Kosovo, in particular compared to East Timor, is primarily due to the fact that in Kosovo this process was led by three organizations: the UN, NATO, and the EU (Howard, 2014). In Kosovo, some of the prerequisites for achieving independence (e.g., geographical location, administrative status, and moderate attitude of the metropolis) were more favorable than those in East Timor. Still, due to the influence of the above six factors, the international recognition of Kosovo (the accession to the UN) has not been yet completed. The study of the events related

to these factors proves that not only their presence matters but also at which stage of geopolitical transformations they take place. In particular, this refers to the recognition by the international community of the nature of a particular conflict as a self-determination conflict.

Kosovo

The autonomous region of Kosovo was established during the formation of Yugoslavia (1945) as part of the Republic of Serbia. During the breakup of Yugoslavia, which practiced a form of Communist ideology, Serbian President Milosevic held a referendum in 1989 to dissolve Kosovo’s autonomy, further used military force against the Kosovar Albanians, which led to the displacement of 460,000 people.

In 1991, the Kosovar Albanians held an illegal referendum in which 87% of the population participated, with 99% voting for Kosovo’s independence. Though initially the movement for Kosovo’s independence was described as a peaceful process, the Kosovo Liberation Army emerged in 1996 and the problem has escalated into an armed conflict.

In March 1999, without the consent of the UNSC, NATO launched military operation against Serbia to prevent the humanitarian disaster, targeting various strategic objects. In August 1999, the Independent International Commission on Kosovo was established, which issued a report describing NATO’s actions in Kosovo as “illegal, but legitimate” (Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000). At the same time, parallel attempts of mediation were initiated, the most notable of which were the negotiations held in Rambouillet. In June 1999, the President of Serbia rejected the Rambouillet agreement, developed under the auspices of the UN, by the attempt of France and Great Britain (UNSC, 1999a). The agreement provided for wider autonomy for Kosovo within Serbia. On June 10, 1999, the SC adopted the resolution S/RES/1244 (1999) (UNSC, 1999b). On its basis, the UN peacekeeping mission came to replace the military units of NATO, and the UN became the chief mediator in the process of conflict settlement. To achieve peace and security, the international security presence in Kosovo assumed two functions:

1. Deterring renewed hostilities, ensuring the safe return of refugees and the transfer of humanitarian aid, demining and border monitoring;
2. A peace enforcement mandate to ensure a ceasefire, and demilitarization (UNSC resolution 1999b, para. 9).

In 2003, the UNSC approved the document called “Standards for Kosovo” (UNSC 2003). It was planned to first entrench democratic values in Kosovo, and only then address the issue of political status. However, in March 2004, tired of waiting, the Albanians revolted, and a new

wave of violence broke out. The resumption of hostilities confirmed that when the issue of status is for some reason relegated to the background in the event of self-determination conflicts, the temptation for the metropolis to solve the problem by military means sharply increases. The process of conflict settlement was led by Kai Eide, who stressed in his 2004 report that there was no possibility of reaching an agreement between the parties to the conflict over the status of Kosovo and the pragmatic solution of conflict should be based on this fact. In November 2005, an attempt was made to involve a more experienced mediator, Martti Ahtisaari, who was appointed as the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Kosovo. In March 2007, Ahtisaari submitted a report to the Secretary-General, stating: "The time has come to resolve Kosovo's status, the negotiations' potential to produce any mutually agreeable outcome on Kosovo's status has been exhausted. The only viable option for Kosovo is independence" ([Secretary-General, 2007](#)). The Secretary-General fully supported the report and presented it to the SC. In June 2007, the idea of Kosovo's independence was also supported by the US president. Nevertheless, the agreement was not reached within the UNSC: Russia and China opposed the independence of Kosovo. In February 2008, the President, Government and the Parliament of Kosovo re-declared the independence of Kosovo, in a joint session. In response to this, Serbia appealed to the UN General Assembly in September 2008, requesting an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on whether the unilateral declaration of Kosovo's independence is in compliance with the norms of international law.

In July 2010, the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion highlighting that "the adoption of the declaration of independence on 17 February 2008 does not violate general international law, Security Council resolution S/RES/1244 (1999b) or the Constitutional Framework, consequently it does not violate any applicable rule of international law" ([ICJ, 2010](#)). This was followed by the recognition of Kosovo of more than one hundred countries. Nevertheless, since Russia, China, and a number of countries supporting them were strongly opposed to Kosovo's recognition and membership to the UN, the attempts have been made to settle the issue by reaching an agreement between Serbia and Kosovo, enticing them to join the EU. To this end, first the EU and then the OSCE got involved in this process. However, the process of conflict settlement did not come to an end. Obviously, it became possible to prevent the resumption of large-scale war operations through the UN peace-keeping mission, and the International Court of Justice gave an exhaustive answer to the discussion of the legal component of the problem in its comprehensive opinion. Still, the intransigent positions of the UNSC permanent members, caused by the deepening geopolitical rivalry, blocked the political solution of the conflict.

Interestingly, almost parallel to this process, Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, regardless of a number of legal and procedural problems. Easy to notice that this was not due to regional characteristics, as Russia adopted different position with regard to another conflict in the South Caucasus—the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

International Peacekeeping and Self-Determination in the Final Stage of the Formation of a New World Order

In 1921, Nagorno-Karabakh was placed within the territory of Azerbaijan by the illegal decision of the Caucasian Bureau of the Communist Party of Russia. During the Soviet years, it has been under the continuing pressure of the punitive machine of the communist regime, which caused mass displacement of population. Nevertheless, in February 1988, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was "unfrozen." Believing the leader of the USSR Gorbachev's promises regarding the democratization and reorganization of public relations, the Regional Council of Nagorno-Karabakh applied to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to remove the region from Azerbaijan and incorporate it to Armenia. In response to this, the communist leadership of Azerbaijan organized massacres of Armenians living in the Azerbaijani capital Baku, Sumgait, and Kirovabad, the perpetrators of which were later sentenced to imprisonment by the Russian courts ([Cox & Eibner, 1993](#)). At the end of 1991, a referendum on secession from the USSR was organized in Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, a referendum on self-determination was held in Nagorno-Karabakh under the Soviet Law: 82.2% of the population participated of which 99% voted for independence. Following the referendum, in 1992, Azerbaijan launched a large-scale military aggression against Nagorno-Karabakh ([Gor, 2008](#)). The hostilities continued until May 1994, when a ceasefire agreement was signed. In 1992, the OSCE convened a conference in Minsk, creating the format of the MG, for the purpose of resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Group is co-chaired by Russia, the US, and France, who are also the permanent members of the UN Security Council. The process of conflict settlement under the Minsk Group took a sharp turn when, after a number of unsuccessful attempts to draft a settlement plan, the Co-Chairs defined the three principles of international law (the right of peoples to equality and self-determination, the principle of territorial integrity, and the principle of the non-use of force and the threat of it), on the basis of which the conflict should be resolved, and six elements for which solutions were to be negotiated. In 2007, the Co-Chairs presented the document named "Madrud Principles" to Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan. In 2009, a statement was signed by the three Co-Chairs, as well as the Foreign Ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia

(MG, 2009), and the document “Madrid Principles” was adopted as the basis for the settlement of conflict. Several international organizations, among which the UN, the EU, the Council of Europe, as well as some influential countries, have continuously expressed their support to the Minsk Group, noting that the settlement of the conflict should be carried out within that format and on the basis of the principles proposed by the Co-Chairs. Consequently, it can be argued that the international community recognized the right of self-determination of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2007, and negotiations were underway to implement it and to address other conflict-related issues.

The negotiations continued until 2018, during which a number of decisions on six elements have been discussed. They differed from each other in the nuances of the decisions of individual elements. In particular, the latest version provided: “As for the options for resolving the problem of the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh, the proposals at the negotiating table in recent years have envisaged, I quote, ‘Determining the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh, holding a popular vote under the auspices of the UN or the OSCE within the terms agreed by the parties, which will express the free will of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh and will be legally binding in accordance with the norms and principles of international law. The question or questions put to the vote will not be limited in any way, and any outcome of voting will be respected by the parties (Mid.ru, 2021).’”

In 2016, the President of Azerbaijan Aliyev complained: “Azerbaijan is under pressure to agree to the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh” (Eadaily, 2016). That is why, to divert the negotiation process in other direction, in April 2016, Azerbaijan organized a large-scale aggression against Nagorno-Karabakh. The hostilities were stopped 4 days later, due to the intervention of mediators, and primarily Russia. The negotiations continued until 2018, during which several options for solutions on six elements have been discussed. Following the 2018 change of power in Armenia, the new Prime Minister claimed that he was starting the negotiations from scratch, which Azerbaijan, backed by Turkey, used as an excuse to unleash military aggression against Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2020. There are many testimonies of the crimes committed by Azerbaijan during the war: killing of civilians, bombing of civilian objects and religious buildings, the use of cluster and phosphorous munitions, the transfer of mercenaries from Syria and other countries to participate in military operations, etc. (EP, 2021; Foreign Relations Committee, 2022; Lemkin Institute, 2022; Sénat, 2020).

All three countries co-chairing the MG are simultaneously permanent members of the UN Security Council. Consequently, they are obliged to “protect the population of Nagorno-Karabakh from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and other crimes against humanity,” according to the “responsibility to protect” principle adopted by the UN member states in 2005 (UNGA, 2005). This entails the

responsibility to prevent, in the event of failure, the responsibility to respond, up to and including military intervention, as well as the responsibility to rebuild. Still, the UN SC did not take any practical steps to stop the 44-day bloody aggression. The reason may lie in the fact that the 1992 and 2016 military aggressions against Nagorno-Karabakh were stopped without the intervention of the SC, and it was probably assumed that the same scenario would follow. On November 9, 2020, a Declaration was signed with the mediation and participation of Russia (Mid.ru, 2020), according to which military operations were suspended and the Russian peacekeepers were deployed along the contact line and the Lachin Corridor in Nagorno-Karabakh. The statement had many shortcomings both in terms of its legal format and content.

Nevertheless, it seemed that after the establishment of ceasefire, the negotiations would resume in the format of the Minsk Group and the shortcomings would be addressed; the Co-Chairs made several joint statements on the incompleteness of conflict settlement and the necessity to continue negotiations based on the abovementioned principles and elements to address the remaining issues, among which the determination of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh (MG, 2020a; MG, 2020b; MG, 2021). This point of view was also backed by the international community (Crisis Group, 2023). Meanwhile, Azerbaijan claims that the conflict has been resolved and continues to use military aggression. In 2022, Azerbaijan initiated three major military clashes of which two in Nagorno-Karabakh in March and August and a third, on September 13–14, when the Azerbaijani forces penetrated several kilometers deep into the Armenian border and still remain there (Crisis Group, 2023). The Russian peacekeepers are unable to take any effective steps to ease the tension (Crisis Group, 2022; EEAS, 2022; US State Department, 2022; Vartanyan et al., 2022), as neither their status nor powers are determined. The same thing happened when the Lachin corridor, the only road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, has been closed since December 2022 by “environmentalists” enjoying the patronage of Azerbaijan, and 120,000 people have been left without food and medicine (Crisis Group, 2023). The road remained close even after the International Court of Justice demanded from Azerbaijan to ensure the unimpeded transportation of people, vehicles, and cargo through the Lachin corridor (ICJ, 2023). Azerbaijan ignored this decision, in September 2023 resumed military aggression against the settlements of Nagorno-Karabakh, and subjected the entire population to ethnic cleansing under threat of extermination, forcing 120,000 Armenians to leave Nagorno-Karabakh and seek refuge in Armenia as refugees.

During 1992–2020, despite their disagreements on other issues, the US, Russia, and France effectively cooperated within the framework of the Minsk Group, while since mid 2021, they have not made any effort to restore this format for resolving the problem. Quite the opposite. After the two

more meetings and statements with the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan at the initiative of Russia, following the statement of November 9, 2020, separate processes were also initiated by Charles Michel and Emmanuel Macron in Brussels, and by the US State Department in Washington. Thus, the internationally recognized format of negotiations was distorted. Negotiations within the MG were replaced by the initiatives undertaken by individual states, which, in its turn, caused the lack of mechanisms of mutual checks and balances between mediators. What is more, the problem of the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was replaced by the problem of borders between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The statements that Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh should discuss the conflict-related issues through direct meetings are hypocrisy. The internationally recognized format of the Minsk Group does not function, and the agenda and the document at the negotiating table formed during 13 years under the MG are put aside, without offering anything in return.

It is commonly held that the UN adopts resolutions on self-determination conflicts and the establishment of peacekeeping missions when there is a high probability that an imminent war could undermine the regional security or when a conflict has a long history of severe violence (White et al., 2018). The case of Nagorno-Karabakh proves that even in these cases, at the final stage of the struggle for a new world order, influential states often prefer their own interests to steps aimed at preventing humanitarian disaster. Therefore, in such cases, the importance of the activities of the UN Secretary-General, his office, and the related structures sharply increases.

Potential Peacekeeping Missions

Taking into account the existing realities and theoretical possibilities, the following options for peacekeeping missions can be considered for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: CSTO, Russia, OSCE, EU with the authority of the UNSC, or the UN. In the case of the first two options, there is practically no possibility of granting appropriate powers by the Security Council authority, given the extremely aggravated confrontation between the West and Russia. At the same time, in case of this scenario, it will be impossible to provide a balancing factor to avoid the temptation to use the mission in accordance with mediator's interests. Russia's mediation after the war of 2020 is proof of this.

The OSCE and the EU have long been criticized for their structural and functional limitations, their inability to contribute to conflict settlement and sustainable peace-building in the South Caucasus, in particular, in thawing the "frozen conflicts" in South Ossetia in August 2008 and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in April 2016 (Andrei, 2019). This has been best manifested within the entirely new situation emerged in 2020. At the end of October 2021, at the request

of Yerevan, the OSCE sent a 1-week mission to assess the situation of the conflict, but it did not yield any results. The idea of a long-term mission has been supported by the US and France, with the representative of France claiming that it may be the most optimal option, since all interested parties are the OSCE member states. Azerbaijan considers the mediation activities of the OSCE Minsk group unsuccessful and sees no grounds for its effectiveness in regulating relations with Yerevan.

In 2022, the EU sent a short-term observer mission to Armenia, but it seemed to produce no result. Despite a number of concerns, on January 23, 2023, the EU decided to send a new mission to Armenia for a period of 2 years, which should "promote stability in the border areas, ... build confidence" and "ensure a situation conducive to peaceful negotiations" (Council of the EU, 2023). The Azerbaijani officials, pointing to the mission of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh, consider the EU initiative an encroachment on their sovereignty and demand its termination.

This mission faces other serious difficulties. Russian cooperation on this issue is highly challenging: "The Kremlin is increasingly convinced that it is necessary to refuse cooperation with those countries and institutions that provide military aid to Ukraine and apply sanctions against Russia, because this will be perceived as confirmation of their hostile policy towards Russia."

Another problem is the mandate and financing of the mission. There is a belief that the EU initiative "offer the best chance of minimizing the risk of a reprise or an expansion of September's fighting" (Crisis Group, 2023). However, it is necessary to deploy a peacekeeping rather than an observer mission in Armenia with uncertain mandate, since large-scale military aggression can break out again at any moment. Thus, the only real opportunity to provide a genuine solution to the problem is the adoption of the relevant UN SC resolution and the formation of a peacekeeping mission on its basis. The experience of implementing peacekeeping missions and building a state through international administration in Kosovo and East Timor proves that this process encounters serious problems when local characteristics are not taken into account, and the "empty shell" approach is used (Lemay-Hebert, 2011).

Conclusion

- (1) The conduction of peacekeeping missions and the settlement of self-determination conflicts through international organizations other than the UN (OSCE, EU, etc.) has a very low efficiency due to the limitation of their toolkit. The problem is of particular importance for Eurasia, where most of the conflicts of self-determination are concentrated. Therefore, when the process of conflict settlement is at crisis, it is necessary to apply the UN tools.

- (2) In the aftermath of the geopolitical transformations that Eurasia has been at the center of after the collapse of the Soviet Union, along with increasing tensions, the possibilities for peaceful conflict resolution and the prevention of hostilities are sharply decreasing. The UN tools for the prevention of wars and peacekeeping are sufficient to accomplish the main mission of the organization. Nevertheless, the effective use of these tools is often hindered by the use of the right of veto by the SC permanent members, due to the conflict of their interests, especially at the final stage of the formation of a new world order.
- (3) During geopolitical transformations, in particular, at the final stage of the formation of a new world order, active supervisory activities need to be carried out, especially in relation to unsettled conflicts, in order to achieve the statutory goals of the UN and to prevent humanitarian disasters.
- (4) The logic underlying the conflict resolution process in East Timor, Kosovo, and Nagorno-Karabakh fully corresponds to the dynamics of the geopolitical transformations that started as a result of the collapse of the USSR. When the steps to determine the political status of a party seeking to self-determination are carried out promptly and are completed at the initial stage of transformation, the process ends successfully (the case of East Timor and more than 10 other examples of self-determination). When the steps are carried out slowly and the process moves to the next stage of geopolitical transformation, it usually slows down and does not end (the case of Kosovo). When the process starts at the intermediate stage and moves to the final stage, the process goes backwards, it can degrade and even lead to a humanitarian disaster (the case of Nagorno-Karabakh).
- (5) The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a typical example of inadequate response of the permanent members of the UNSC to the military aggression and military operations at the final stage of the struggle of influential states for the formation of a new world order. The only way to rectify the situation and prevent the humanitarian catastrophe is the establishment of the UN peacekeeping mission for the Nagorno-Karabakh based on the plan developed by the representatives of the three permanent members of the UNSC within the format of the MG, and also to ensure the safe return of 120,000 Armenian refugees to Nagorno-Karabakh, their permanent places of residence.
- (6) The three-dimensional model proposed by White and others to assess the decision-making by the UN Security Council on the formation of peacekeeping missions should be complemented by a fourth

dimension—the conflict of geopolitical interests of influential states, which is of great importance in the second and third stages of geopolitical transformations.

- (7) In order to avoid further tragic consequences due to the subjective positions of some permanent members of the UN Security Council, international law can be improved by limiting their influence on decisions. For example, if the relevant international institution recognizes the correctness of the declaration of self-determination and the metropolis tries to resume hostilities, the UN Security Council immediately and without a vote adopts a resolution on the immediate cessation of hostilities, the formation of a peacekeeping mission, the return of refugees, and the beginning of self-determination procedures.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

References

- Andrei, R. G. (2019). Nagorno-Karabakh: Why do peace processes fail 'From the Inside'? *Conflict Studies Quarterly*, 27(April), 21–38. <https://doi.org/10.24193/cs.q.27.2>
- Beardsley, K., & Schmidt, H. (2012). Following the flag or following the charter? Examining the determinants of UN involvement in international crises, 1945–2002. *International Studies Quarterly*, 56(1), 33–49. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00696.x>
- Bell, C. (2000). East Timor, Canberra and Washington: A case study in crisis management. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 54(2), 171–176. <https://doi.org/10.1080/713613507>
- Charter. (1945). Charter of the United Nations. <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf>
- Chopra, J. (2000). The UN's Kingdom of East Timor. *Survival*, 42(3), 27–33. <https://doi.org/10.1093/survival/42.3.27>
- Council of the EU. (2023). *Armenia: EU establishes a civilian mission to contribute to stability in border areas*. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/01/23/armenia-eu-sets-up-a-civilian-mission-to-ensure-security-in-conflict-affected-and-border-areas/>
- Cox, C., & Eibner, J. (1993). *Ethnic cleansing in progress: War in Nagorno-Karabakh*. Christian Solidarity Worldwide.
- Crisis Group. (2013). *Timor-Leste: Stability at what cost?* Asia Report 246. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/timor-leste/timor-leste-stability-what-cost>

- Crisis Group. (2022). *Nagorno-Karabakh: Seeking a path to peace in the Ukraine war's shadow*. Crisis Group Europe Briefing 9322 April.
- Crisis Group. (2023). *Averting a new war between Armenia and Azerbaijan*. Crisis Group Europe Report 266. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/nagorno-karabakh-conflict/266-averting-new-war-between-armenia-and-azerbaijan> (Accessed 4 January).
- Cunliffe, P. (2020). *Cosmopolitan dystopia: International intervention and the failure of the West*. Manchester University Press.
- Cunliffe, P., & Kenkel, K. M. (2016). Rising powers and intervention: Contested norms and shifts in global order. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 29(3), 807–811. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2016.1237048>
- Cunningham, D., & Gallagher, K. (2013). Actor fragmentation and civil war bargaining: How internal divisions generate civil conflict. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(3), 659–672. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12003>
- Declaration. (1970). *Declaration on principles of international law concerning friendly relations and Co-operation among states in accordance with the charter of the United Nations (1970) A/RES/2625 (XXV) 24 Oct.* [https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/2625\(XXV\)](https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/2625(XXV))
- Dunn, J. (2003). *East Timor: A rough passage to independence*. Longueville Books.
- Eadaily. (2016). *Aliyev: Azerbaijan is being forced to recognize the independence of Karabakh*. <https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2016/10/07/aliev-azerbaydzh-an-pytayutsya-zastavit-priznat-nezavisimostkarabaha>
- EEAS. (2022). *Armenia/Azerbaijan: Statement by the Spokesperson on the developments around the Lachin corridor*. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/armeniaazerbaijan-statement-spokesperson-developments-around-lachin-corridor_en
- EP. (2021). *REPORT on the implementation of the common Foreign and security policy – annual report 2020 (2020\2206(INI))*. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2021-0013_EN.pdf
- Foreign Relations Committee. (2022). *Assessing U.S. Policy in the Caucasus, senate of USA*. <https://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/assessing-us-policy-in-the-caucasus>
- Friedrich, J. (2005). UNMIK in Kosovo: Struggling with uncertainty. In A. von Bogdandy & R. Wolfrum (Eds.), *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law* (Vol. 9, pp. 225–293). Brill Academic Publishers. <https://doi.org/10.1163/138946305775160384>
- Gor, P. (2008). *Tis some poor fellows skull. Post-soviet warfare in the southern Caucasus*. iUniverse.
- Howard, L. (2014). Kosovo and Timor-Leste: Neotrusteeship, Neighbors, and the United Nations. *The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 656, 116–135. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716214545308>
- Huntington, S. (1991). *The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century*. University of Oklahoma Press.
- ICJ. (1949). *Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the united nations*. Advisory Opinion 174. <https://www.icj-cij.org/case/4>
- ICJ. (2010). *Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo*. <https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/141/141-20100722-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf>
- ICJ. (2023). *Application of the international convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination (Armenia v. Azerbaijan)*. <https://www.icj-cij.org/case/180>
- Independent International Commission on Kosovo. (2000). *The Kosovo report*. <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/kosovo-report>
- Korhonen, O. (2001). International governance in post-conflict situations. *Leiden Journal of International Law*, 14(3), 495–529. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0922156501000267>
- Krieger, H. (Ed.). (1997). *East Timor and the international community: Basic documents* (pp. 613–618). Cambridge University Press.
- Lemay-Hebert, N. (2011). The “Empty-Shell” approach: The setup process of international administrations in Timor-Leste and Kosovo, its consequences and lessons. *International Studies Perspectives*, 12(2), 190–211. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1528-3585.2011.00427.x>
- Lemkin Institute. (2022). *Statement on self-determination of Armenians in Artsakh (South Caucasus): There is No “peace” or “prosperity” through genocide*. [https://www.lemkininstitute.com/statements-new-page/statement-on-self-determination-of-armenians-in-artsakh-\(south-caucasus\)%3A-there-is-no-peace-or-prosperity-through-genocide](https://www.lemkininstitute.com/statements-new-page/statement-on-self-determination-of-armenians-in-artsakh-(south-caucasus)%3A-there-is-no-peace-or-prosperity-through-genocide)
- Mackinder, H. (1904). The geographical pivot of history. *The Geographical Journal*, 23(4), Article 421. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1775498>
- Mackinder, H. (1919). *Democratic ideals and reality*. Constable and Company.
- Marshall, M., & Gurr, T. R. (2003). *Peace and conflict 2003: A global survey of armed conflicts, self-determination movements, and democracy*. University of Maryland: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. <https://cidcm.umd.edu/publications/peace-and-conflict-2003>
- Matheson, M. (2001). United Nations governance of postconflict societies. *American Journal of International Law*, 95(1), 76–85. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2642038>
- MG. (2009). *Joint statement by the heads of delegation of the Minsk group Co-chair countries and the Foreign Ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia athens*. <https://www.osce.org/cio/40626>
- MG. (2020a). *Joint statement by the heads of delegation of the OSCE Minsk group Co-chair countries*. <https://www.osce.org/minsk-group/472419>
- MG. (2020b). *Statement of the OSCE Minsk group Co-chairs*. <https://www.osce.org/minsk-gro-up/473649>
- MG. (2021). *Statement of the OSCE Minsk group Co-chairs*. <https://www.osce.org/minsk-group/483416>
- Mid.ru. (2020). *Statement by the president of the republic of Azerbaijan, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia*

- and the President of the Russian Federation. https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1446283/?lang=en
- Mid.ru. (2021). *Answer of the Russian Co-chair in the OSCE Minsk group, ambassador-at-large of the Russian Foreign Ministry I. V. Popov to a media question regarding the article by the Prime Minister of Armenia N. V. Pashinyan "The Origins of the 44 Day War"*. https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4519475
- Paris, R. (2014). The geopolitics of peace operations: A research Agenda. *International Peacekeeping*, 21(4), 501–508. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2014.9467430>
- Putin's speech. (2007). *Putin's speech at the Munich security conference*. <https://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034>
- Ryngaert, C., & Sobrie, S. (2011). Recognition of states: International law or realpolitik? The practice of recognition in the wake of Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia. *Leiden Journal of International Law*, 24(2), 467–490. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0922156511000100>
- Secretary-General. (2007). *Letter dated 26 March 2007 from the secretary-general addressed to the president of the security Council*. <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/document/Kosovo-S2007-168.php>
- Secretary-General. (2011). *Preventive diplomacy, delivering results*. https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SGReport_PreventiveDiplomacy_S2011552%28english%29_2.pdf
- Sénat. (2020). *Résolution portant sur la nécessité de reconnaître la République du Haut-Karabagh*. 26 (2020-2021). 25 Novembre. <https://www.senat.fr/leg/tas20-026.pdf>
- Smith, M., & Dee, M. (2003). *Peacekeeping in East Timor: The path to independence*. Lynne Rienner.
- Torosyan, T., & Petrosyan, M. (2015). Comparative analysis of conflicts: Modeling problems. *Armenian Journal of Political Science*, 2(3), 121–138. <https://doi.org/10.19266/1829-4286-2015-02-121-138>
- Torosyan, T., & Vardanyan, A. (2015). The South Caucasus conflicts in the context of struggle for the Eurasian Heartland. *Geopolitics*, 20(3), 559–582. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2015.1050717>
- Torosyan, T., & Vardanyan, A. (2021). Conceptualizing a methodology for a comparative analysis of the success of secessions. *Polis. Political Studies*, (1), 41–57. <https://doi.org/10.17976/jpps/2021.01.04>
- Torosyan, T., & Vardanyan, A. (2024). The impact of geopolitical transformations on the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: Self-determination or genocide? *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict*, 17(3), 221–238. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2024.2370245>
- UNGA. (2005). *Resolution adopted by the general assembly on 16 September*. https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_60_1.pdf
- UNGA. (2015). *Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects*. file:///D:/USER/Downloads/A_70_95-S_2015_446-EN.pdf.
- UNSC. (1999a). *Rambouillet accords*. <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/document/kos-s-1999-648.php>
- UNSC. (1999b). *UN security Council resolution S/RES/1244(1999)*.
- UNSC. (2003). *Standards for Kosovo*. <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Kos/Standards.pdf>
- UNSC. (2022). *Armenia-Azerbaijan border clashes: Meeting under "Any Other Business"*. <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2022/09/armenia-azerbaijan-border-clashes-meeting-under-any-other-business.php>
- US State Department. (2022). *US Department Press Briefing – December 13, 2022*. US State Department. <https://2021-2025.state.gov/briefings/departement-press-briefing-december-13-2022/>.
- Vartanyan, O., Shiriyev, Z., & Mihaeljana, A. (2022). *Warding off renewed war in Nagorno-Karabakh*. Crisis Group Commentary.
- von Carlowitz, L. (2003). UNMIK lawmaking between effective peace support and internal self-determination. *Archiv des Völkerrechts*, 41(3), 336–393. <https://doi.org/10.1628/0003892034443749>
- Weidmann, N., Kuse, D., & Gleditsch, K. (2010). The geography of the international system: The shapes dataset. *International Interactions*, 36(1), 86–106. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050620903554614>
- White, P., Cunningham, D., & Beardsley, K. (2018). Where, when, and how does the UN work to prevent civil war in self-determination disputes? *Journal of Peace Research*, 55(3), 380–394. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343317744826>
- Yannis, A. (2004). The UN as Government in Kosovo. *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, 10(1), 67–81. <https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-01001007>